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POSITIONBIAS INBEST-WORST SCALINGSURVEYS:
ACASESTUDYONTRUST IN INSTITUTIONS
DANNY CAMPBELL AND SEDA ERDEM
This paper investigates the effect of items’ physical position in the best-worst scaling technique.
Although the best-worst scaling technique has been widely used in many fields, the literature has
largely overlooked the phenomenon of consumers’ adoption of processing strategies while making
their best-worst choices. We examine this issue in the context of consumers’ trust in institutions to
provide information about a new food technology, nanotechnology, and its use in food processing.
Our results show that approximately half of the consumers used position as a schematic cue when
making choices. We find the position bias was particularly strong when consumers chose their
most trustworthy institution compared to their least trustworthy institution. In light of our find-
ings, we recommend that researchers in the field be aware of the possibility of position bias when
designing best-worst scaling surveys. We also encourage researchers who have already collected
best-worst data to investigate whether their data shows such heuristics.
Key words: Best-worst scaling, position bias, consumer trust, multinomial logit model, latent class
logit model, nanotechnology.
JEL codes: C25, D12, Q18.
A cause for concern in stated choice experi-
ments is that respondents exhibit a decision
rule or processing strategy while making
choices. A number of these processing strate-
gies have been studied in the stated pref-
erence literature, mainly in discrete choice
experiments. These strategies include attri-
bute non-attendance (Hensher, Rose, and
Greene 2005; Campbell, Hutchinson, and
Scarpa 2008; Scarpa et al. 2013; Mørkbak,
Olsen, and Campbell 2014), attribute-level
non-attendance (Erdem, Campbell, and
Hole 2014), elimination- and selection-by
aspects (Campbell, Hensher, and Scarpa
2012; Erdem, Campbell, and Thompson 2014;
Campbell, Hensher, and Scarpa 2014), and
ordering effects (Day et al. 2012; Carson,
Mørkbak, and Olsen 2012). This paper is
motivated by the question of whether some
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of these issues discovered in other stated
preference methods are also present in best-
worst scaling (BWS), which was developed
by Finn and Louviere (1992) and colleagues.
Although the BWS has been around for
some time, it is only recently that we have
witnessed its widespread application in a
number of disciplines, including agriculture
(e.g., Lusk and Briggeman 2009; Erdem,
Rigby, and Wossink 2012), environmental
studies (e.g., Scarpa et al. 2011), health (e.g.,
Louviere and Flynn 2011), and marketing
(e.g., Cohen 2009). The BWS technique
involves respondents choosing two items
in a subset of a large list where terms are
arranged according to importance (e.g., best
and worst, or most and least important).
More about the technique and recent exam-
ples can be found in Flynn et al. (2007), Lusk
and Briggeman (2009), Scarpa et al. (2011),
and Erdem and Rigby (2013).
In this paper, we examine whether respon-
dents use item position as a schematic cue
when making best-worst choices. We investi-
gate the extent to which the probability of an
alternative being chosen depends not only on
its item, but also on its position in the choice
task. Our paper is motivated by the fact that
failing to recognize this phenomenon has
Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 97(2): 526–545; doi: 10.1093/ajae/aau112
Published online January 20, 2015
© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural and Applied Economics
Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
 at U
niversity of Stirling Library on M
ay 11, 2015
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Campbell and Erdem Position Bias in Best-worst Scaling Surveys 527
implications for choice predictions, and could
have serious repercussions for policy rec-
ommendations. In particular, models that do
not correctly address actual choice behavior
will be less useful for priority-setting, and
will ultimately hinder efficient policy making.
To identify the extent of this issue and to
address it, this paper recommends the use of
position-specific constants alongside models
accommodating a number of latent classes,
where the classes are typified by preference
heterogeneity and/or position effects.
The empirical case study detailed in this
paper focuses on a sample of UK consumers’
trust in agents and organizations, and aims to
provide balanced and accurate information
about nanotechnology and its use in food
production. Given the contentious history of
recent food-related technologies, for exam-
ple, genetic modification and irradiation, it is
crucial to understand whom consumers trust
the most and the least regarding information
about emerging food technologies such as
nanotechnology and its implementation. Such
information may help explain the public’s
attitude towards accepting the technology,
which may then affect its adoption in the
industry. The case study makes an important
contribution in this area.
Overall, our findings show that: (1) the
choices made by around half of our sample
(who are more likely to be female, older, and
educated) were not sensitive to any posi-
tion bias; (2) the probability of an institution
being chosen depends not only on the institu-
tion itself, but also on its position in the BWS
choice task (especially among males and
respondents who are younger and less edu-
cated); (3) the institution positioned at the
top of the choice task stands a significantly
higher chance of been identified as the most
trustworthy; and (4) not accommodating for
position bias has significant implications on
choice predictions, priority-setting, and the
model fit.
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. In the next section we provide a brief
background on position effects. We describe
our methodology, as well as the modeling
approach for exploring these position effects,
or biases, and preference heterogeneity in
section three. In section four, we outline our
empirical case study, BWS data, and sur-
vey design. The main results are reported
in section five, followed by the final section,
which concludes the paper.
Position Effects
An extensive body of literature in consumer
research and marketing and psychology has
shown that the manner in which people per-
ceive items, people, or goods often depends
on their physical ordering. This includes
“edge avoidance” (Rubinstein, Tversky,
and Heller 1997), “centrality preferences”
(Shaw et al. 2000), “middle bias” (Attali and
Bar-Hillel 2003), as well as “center-stage
effect” (Valenzuela and Raghubir 2009).
The situations where these position effects,
or biases, have been identified are varied,
and include the following: the ordering of
response alternatives in multiple-choice
tests (Attali and Bar-Hillel 2003); the alloca-
tion of shelf-space in supermarkets (Inman,
McAlister, and Hoyer 1990; Wright 2002;
Meier and Robinson 2004; Valenzuela and
Raghubir 2009); the placement of people
(McArthur and Post 1977; Raghubir and
Valenzuela 2006; Rodway, Schepman, and
Lambert 2013); and items (e.g., products)
(Valenzuela and Raghubir 2009; Guney
2014). In these situations, the effects are
exhibited in both the “horizontal dimen-
sion of space” (see Nisbett and Wilson 1977;
Valenzuela, Raghubir, and Mitakakis 2013)
and “vertical dimension of space” (see Meier
and Robinson 2004; Koppell and Steen 2004;
Schubert 2005; Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011).
In the horizontal dimension of space, it
has been repeatedly shown that the arrange-
ment of products from left to right influences
consumers’ perception of value, their judg-
ments, and ultimately their purchase deci-
sions (e.g., see Raghubir and Valenzuela 2006;
Chandon et al. 2009; Valenzuela and Raghu-
bir 2009). Specifically, findings in Chandon
et al. (2009) and Valenzuela, Raghubir, and
Mitakakis (2013) revealed that consumers
perceive products positioned in the center
of a shelf as being more popular, premium,
or promoted products. Similar effects are
observed in other contexts. For example,
using six different case studies, Raghubir
and Valenzuela (2006) ascertained a strong
“center-stage” influence. These authors’
research revealed that people often judged
the person in a central position as being more
important, a better performer, or more likely
to be successful. Raghubir and Valenzuela
acknowledged that this heuristic may be due
to salience effects (i.e., stimulus that makes
it stand apart from other similar stimuli due
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to its inherent characteristics), attributional
effects (i.e., better performers often chose
positions that are more salient and more
likely to be evaluated more favorably), and
social norms (i.e., more prominent people sit
in the middle of the table; McArthur and Post
1977).
Connotations and associations of vertical
space are in widespread metaphoric use in
our daily life (e.g., “on top of things,” “high
points,” “thumbs up/down,” “hitting rock bot-
tom,” and “climbing the corporate ladder”),
where the vertical dimension of space influ-
ences perceptions of value. Not surprisingly,
several studies in the fields of marketing and
psychology have sought to investigate the
issue. The overwhelming evidence from these
studies is that items or products located at
the top (or higher) are perceived to be “bet-
ter” or evaluated more positively than those
placed at the bottom (or lower; e.g., Meier
et al. 2007; Valenzuela and Raghubir 2010;
Valenzuela, Raghubir, and Mitakakis 2013).
These are also referred to as primacy and
recency order effects. For example, Chandon
et al. (2009) found that products on the top
and middle shelves gain more attention
compared to those on the bottom shelf, and
discovered that the effects of vertical posi-
tion are stronger than any left versus right
effect. Again, the influence of vertical posi-
tioning goes beyond marketing. For instance,
research by Meier and Robinson (2004) has
demonstrated that “positive” words are rec-
ognized faster when they were placed at the
top of the screen, whereas the recognition of
“negative” words is stronger when they were
placed at the bottom of the screen.
Vertical position is also often linked with
the notion of power and seniority. The find-
ings in Schubert (2005) revealed that group
labels are typically perceived as being more
powerful when they were placed at the top
of the screen relative to the bottom of the
screen. This is also exemplified in corporate
organizational charts, where the CEO is
located at the top of the chart, followed by
directors, managers, and other employees in
the hierarchy.
Horizontal and vertical position effects do
not necessarily work in isolation. For exam-
ple, Valenzuela, Raghubir, and Mitakakis
(2013) found that retailers place the premium
brand on the top, the cheapest brand on
the bottom, the most popular brand in the
center, products in promotion at the hori-
zontal extremes (like in Inman, McAlister,
and Hoyer 1990), and store brands next to
promoted and popular brands in the center.
With the knowledge that position is a com-
monly employed heuristic, researchers have
looked into whether it can be used for nudg-
ing people towards healthier decisions by
exploring the position effect on food menus
(e.g., Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011) and shelf
position of healthy and unhealthy foods (e.g.,
van Kleef, Otten, and van Trijp 2012; Rozin
et al. 2011).
In this paper, we focus on the vertical posi-
tion effect in a BWS survey. The BWS data
is particularly well-suited to exploring this
position bias due to the nature of BWS tasks
asking respondents to identify their “best”
and “worst” choices among a subset of a
large list of items. In the following section, we
describe how we identify and accommodate
for this position bias.
Methodology
We start this section by providing a brief
description of the BWS technique. We follow
this by introducing the necessary notation
and a basic model for analyzing the BWS
data. Then we expand on this base model to
uncover the role of an item’s position on its
likelihood of being chosen as best and worst,
and by making provision for preference
heterogeneity.
The Best-worst Scaling Method
While people can usually comfortably rank
a small list of items, as the list of items that
are to be ranked increases, the ranking task
becomes more cognitively challenging and,
importantly, susceptible to a range of anoma-
lous behaviors. The BWS technique avoids
this by breaking tasks into more manageable
sizes, thereby reducing—if not eliminating—
difficulty in ranking the full list of items in
terms of their importance (or preferability).
Furthermore, as respondents only choose at
the extreme (i.e., best/worst or most/least),
the process is considered to be “scale-free”
and prevents a scale-use bias (Baumgartner
and Steenkamp 2001). For example, when
using a likert scale for identifying respon-
dents’ level of preferences, there may be
situations where respondents may only focus
on one part of the scale. Moreover, there may
be cases where respondents have difficulty
in distinguishing the differences between the
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levels of the scale. For example, the differ-
ence between “strongly agree” and “agree”
may be difficult to identify. This creates an
ambiguity in the interpretation of these scale
levels across respondents. In BWS, however,
such ambiguity is absent, as only extremes
are needed to be identified in a subset of
items. There is also evidence that people
use better judgment when they only need
to identify the extremes, rather than prefer-
ences with levels (Louviere 1993; Marley and
Louviere 2005).
The BWS approach has been used, and
shown to be suitable, in a number of research
areas to assess people’s perception of intan-
gible concepts. For example, Erdem and
Rigby (2013) examined the general public’s
perception of control and worry over vari-
ous risks; Erdem, Rigby, and Wossink (2012)
looked at consumer perception of relative
responsibility for ensuring food safety; Lou-
viere and Flynn (2011) examined the public’s
perception and preferences for healthcare
reform in Australia; and Auger, Devinney,
and Louviere (2007) investigated the atti-
tudes of consumers towards social and ethical
issues such as recycling and human rights,
across six countries.
Basic Model and Background Notation
The BWS is an application of the random
utility maximization theory (Manski 1977;
Thurstone 1927), whereby respondents eval-
uate all possible pairs of items within the
displayed BWS task and choose the pair that
reflects their maximum difference in prefer-
ence. The number of unique pairs, J, is given
by S(S − 1), where S represents the number
of items in the BWS task. Overall utility, U ,
associated with respondent n’s chosen pair,
i, in BWS task t is given by the difference in
utility between the best and worst items:
(1) Unit = (βxbnit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Best
− (βxwnit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worst
+ εnit
where β is a vector of estimated param-
eters (subject to
∑K
k=1 βk = 0) relating to
the best and worst items, x (indexed by b
and w respectively), and ε is an iid type I
extreme value (EV1) distributed error term,
with constant variance of π2/6. Given these
assumptions, the probability of the sequence
of best-worst choices made by individual n
can be represented by the multinomial logit
(MNL) model:
Pr(yn|xn)(2)
=
Tn∏
t=1
exp((βxbnit ) − (βxwnit ))∑J
j=1 exp((βxbnjt) − (βxwnjt))
where yn gives the sequence of best-
worst choices over the Tn BWS tasks for
respondent n, that is, yn = [in1, in2, . . . , inTn ].1
The vector of estimated parameters, β, are
on an interval scale and typically consist of
both negative and positive values, making
interpretation difficult. For this reason, sim-
ilar to Erdem and Rigby (2013), it is useful
to convert the raw coefficients, which are
zero-centered, to ratio-scaled probabilities,
which we denote using
∗
Pr(x). For item k,
the conversion to a 0–100 point ratio scale is
achieved as follows:
∗
Pr(xk) =
(
exp(βk)
exp(βk) + S − 1
/
(3)
K∑
k=1
exp(βk)
exp(βk) + S − 1
)
× 100
where S, as previously defined, is the num-
ber of items shown per choice task. These
ratio-scaled probabilities provide an intuitive
interpretation, since we can say that an item
with a score of 20 is twice as preferred or
important as an item with a score of 10.
Accounting for Position Bias
The choice probability retrieved from
expression (2) assumes that all respondents
consider all offered items and the likelihood
of best and worst choices are independent
from their position. However, it is important
to recognize that the probability of choice
may depend not only on utility, but also on an
item’s location. In particular, in line with evi-
dence found in the papers discussed above,
one could postulate that position acts as a
schematic cue that leads to systematic biases
in respondents’ decisions. For example, when
choosing the item that provides them with
1 We note that accounting for the panel effect is immaterial in
the MNL model due to the independence of choice probabilities.
We nevertheless present the MNL model in this manner to
introduce the necessary terms as early on as possible so that
differences in models are clearer as we progress through this
section.
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the greatest utility, respondents may be more
inclined to choose among the options located
closer to the top (or left) of the choice
task. In contrast, the item they indicate as
being the worst has a tendency to be located
closer to the bottom (or right) of the choice
task.
Failing to account for this vertical or hori-
zontal position bias could lead to misguided
inferences, as the model does not reflect
actual choice behavior. A straightforward
approach for addressing this phenomenon is
to introduce position-specific constants into
the utility function as follows:
(4)
Pr(yn|xn)
=
Tn∏
t=1
exp((βxbnit + γbnit) − (βxwnit + γwnit))∑J
j=1 exp((βxbnjt + γbnjt) − (βxwnjt + γwnjt))
where the γ terms denote the position-
specific constants, which capture the average
effect on utility of all factors that are not
included in the model.2 In cases where there
are no systematic differences due to item
position, we should expect γ= 0. However,
in situations where item position has a bear-
ing on choice outcomes (either negative or
positive), we can expect to find γ = 0. Note
that the γ terms are indexed by either b or
w to distinguish the role of position on best
and worst choices, respectively. For identifi-
cation purposes, the values of γb and γw are
subject to the constraint
∑S
s=1 γbs = 0 and∑S
s=1 γws = 0, respectively, meaning that they
are zero-centered and are also suitable for
probability-based rescaling.
The introduction of position-specific con-
stants represents a first step in uncovering the
systematic impact of item position on best
and worst choices. Nevertheless, a concern
remains that the results could be biased by
a subset of respondents who entirely over-
looked the items, but made their choices
based purely on the item’s position. In the
same vein, there may be another subset of
respondents who consistently disregarded the
position and made choices that were solely
driven by the items themselves. Suggesting
2 Note that these position-specific constants are analogous to
the alternative-specific constants that are routinely used in discrete
choice modeling. However, in our case, the alternative-specific
constants are effectively the difference between the relevant pair
of position-specific constants for the best and worst choices.
the adoption of these different process-
ing strategies is equivalent to identifying
three separate classes of choice behavior
among respondents: 1) a class in which the
choices reflect the preferences of the items
in the BWS survey; 2) a class where both
preferences and position influenced choice
outcomes; and 3) a class in which the choices
are entirely a result of schematic cues based
on the item’s position within the choice task.
Respectively, the utility functions associ-
ated with these three classes can be described
by:
V1nit = (βxbnit + γbnit) − (βxwnit + γwnit),(5a)
V2nit = (βxbnit) − (βxwnit), and(5b)
V3nit = (γbnit) − (γwnit)(5c)
where Vc represents the observable part of
utility associated with class c. While decid-
ing the number of processing strategies
to accommodate is an empirical consid-
eration, the actual choice process used by
respondents remains latent. To work around
this, based on observed choice behavior,
probabilistic conditions can be imposed
on the utility expressions in (5). In doing
so, the presence of processing strategies
can be established up to a probability, with
the full probability per respondent allocated
across all C classes. Under this framework,
the probability of best-worst choice can be
represented as follows:
(6) Pr(yn|xn) =
C∑
c=1
πc
Tn∏
t=1
exp(Vcnit)∑J
j=1 exp(Vcnjt)
where πc denotes the unconditional proba-
bilities associated with observing the utility
function relating to class c (i.e., the likelihood
of competing processing strategies being their
actual strategy).
Accounting for Heterogeneous Preferences
and Processing Strategies
The model described in equation (6) accom-
modates respondents with different utility
functions and, to avoid confounding between
heterogeneity in preferences and process-
ing, equality constraints (see Scarpa et al.
2009) are imposed on β in expressions (5a)
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and (5b), as well as for γ in (5a) and (5c).
This model is based on the assumption that
all respondents have the same preferences
and/or are equally influenced by position. For
a variety of reasons, most empirical evidence
reveals heterogeneity rather than homogene-
ity across respondents. Therefore, we treat
each of the β and γ parameters as finitely
distributed random terms, now denoted with
the subscript c (i.e., βc and γc, respectively),
to represent classes with heterogeneous
preferences and processing strategies. For
example, if we assume that there are two seg-
ments in the population, both of which have
their own preferences, and that there are
also two segments in the population, both of
which exhibit different position effects, then
six utility expressions—and, hence, latent
classes—initially come to mind:
V1nit = (β1xbnit + γ1bnit )−(β1xwnit + γ1wnit );(7a)
V2nit = (β1xbnit) − (β1xwnit);(7b)
V3nit = (γ1bnit ) − (γ1wnit );(7c)
V4nit = (β2xbnit + γ2bnit )−(β2xwnit + γ2wnit );(7d)
V5nit = (β2xbnit) − (β2xwnit); and(7e)
V6nit = (γ2bnit ) − (γ2wnit ).(7f )
In addition to the above, we should recog-
nize that for some respondents estimated as
having β1, their position effects may be best
described using γ2 and, similarly, the possibil-
ity that the position effects characterized by
γ1 may have been exhibited by respondents
with the item coefficients β2. Therefore, it is
important to recognize two further classes:
V7nit = (β1xbnit + γ2bnit )−(β1xwnit + γ2wnit );(7g)
V8nit = (β2xbnit + γ1bnit )−(β2xwnit + γ1wnit ).(7h)
Including (7g) and (7h) means that we are
in a better position to jointly identify the
marginal utilities and position influences.
This is important since it goes some way
towards alleviating the risk of confounding
(see Campbell, Hensher, and Scarpa 2012;
Hensher, Collins, and Greene 2012; and Hess
et al. 2012, for a discussion on this issue).
Once again, the probabilities associated with
the above eight representative utility func-
tions, as well as the segment-specific vector of
βs and γs, can be derived using equation (6),
where C = 8.
Data
The BWS data is obtained from an empiri-
cal case study that investigates consumers’
trust in institutions to provide accurate and
balanced information regarding the use of
nanotechnology and its use in food pro-
duction. Overall, we used 16 institutions,
ranging from government institutions to the
media, friends, and family. Table 1 shows the
institutions included in the BWS survey.
Survey design plays an important role in
obtaining reliable responses. In our survey,
each respondent was presented with five
institutions in each of eight BWS choice
tasks. For each choice task, they were asked
to indicate the “most” and “least” trustworthy
institutions among the presented subset of
institutions. Figure 1 illustrates a typical BWS
task presented to the respondents. Given that
the total number of items used in the survey
is quite large, we felt that it is plausible to use
five items in each choice task. This decision
was also driven by feedback from the pilot
study, as well as evidence that showing more
than five items to respondents may result in
confusion and fatigue (e.g., see Cohen and
Orme 2004), which may, in turn, result in
unreliable responses.
The experimental design comprised of 300
versions (i.e., blocks) to avoid any context
and ordering based biases. In each BWS
choice task, different combinations of five
institutions were shown to respondents. The
combinations of five institutions in these
choice tasks satisfy the optimal design char-
acteristics: frequency balance; orthogonality;
positional balance; and connectivity among
tasks within and across each block. That is,
the one-way frequencies reveal that the sur-
vey design was perfectly balanced as each
item in the survey was displayed 750 times
across all versions of the surveys.3 The two-
way frequencies show that the survey had
a nearly orthogonal main-effects design, in
which each item appeared an average of 200
times with every other item, with a standard
deviation of 0.51. The positional frequencies
show that each item, on average, appeared
150 times at each position (i.e., first, second,
3 As five items are presented in each set, overall there were
40 items shown in every version (i.e., 5 items times 8 tasks).
As there are 16 institutions in total, each institution appeared
approximately 2.5 times in each version. Across all 300 versions,
each institution appears 750 times.
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Table 1. Institutions and Agents Included in the Best-worst Scaling Study
Coding in model
Item Institution/agent output
Government institutions
1 Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs DEFRA
2 Food Standards Agency FSA
3 Department of Health DH
Scientists
4 Food industry scientists FoodIndSci
5 University scientists UniSci
Non-government organizations
6 Consumer organizations (e.g., Which?, National Consumer
Federation, etc.)
ConsumOrg
7 Environmental groups (e.g., Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, etc.) EnvGrps
Food handlers
8 Food manufacturers/processors Manufact
9 Farmers/growers Farmers
10 Supermarkets Supermkt
11 High street butchers Butchers
Friends and family
12 Friends and family Friends
Media
13 TV/radio: news programs News
14 TV/radio: food and cooking programs FoodProg
15 Newspapers NewsPaps
16 Food magazines (e.g., Good Food magazine, Sainsbury’s and Tesco’s
magazines, etc.)
Magazines
Consider the five organisations/people shown below. Please indicate which of the five you:
Trust MOST to provide accurate and balanced information about nanotechnology and its use
in food production
Trust LEAST to provide accurate and balanced information about nanotechnology and its use
in food production
Trust most Trustno least on
nanotechnologynanotechnology
Newspapers
Environmental groups
Farmers/growers
Food industry scientists
Food Standards Agency
Figure 1. Typical best-best scaling task
third, fourth, and fifth) with a standard devi-
ation of 0.45. After ensuring a balanced and
nearly orthogonal survey design, tasks were
randomized, and a participant was randomly
assigned to a version.
The web-based surveys were conducted
with a sample of 616 consumers in the UK
in 2010. With each respondent answering
8 BWS tasks, we obtained a total of 4,298
observations for model estimation. The
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Table 2. Observed Choices
95% confidence
Best (s) Worst (s) Pair (j) Count Percentage interval (percent)
1 1136 23.05 21.88–24.23
2 1078 21.88 20.72–23.03
3 909 18.45 17.36–19.53
4 917 18.61 17.52–19.69
5 888 18.02 16.95–19.09
1 1008 20.45 19.33–21.58
2 930 18.87 17.78–19.96
3 910 18.47 17.38–19.55
4 1038 21.06 19.92–22.20
5 1042 21.14 20.00–22.28
1 2 1 252 5.11 4.50–5.73
1 3 2 297 6.03 5.36–6.69
1 4 3 304 6.17 5.50–6.84
1 5 4 283 5.74 5.09–6.39
2 1 5 260 5.28 4.65–5.90
2 3 6 219 4.44 3.87–5.02
2 4 7 314 6.37 5.69–7.05
2 5 8 285 5.78 5.13–6.44
3 1 9 261 5.30 4.67–5.92
3 2 10 210 4.26 3.70–4.83
3 4 11 215 4.36 3.79–4.93
3 5 12 223 4.53 3.94–5.11
4 1 13 244 4.95 4.35–5.56
4 2 14 239 4.85 4.25–5.45
4 3 15 183 3.71 3.19–4.24
4 5 16 251 5.09 4.48–5.71
5 1 17 243 4.93 4.33–5.54
5 2 18 229 4.65 4.06–5.23
5 3 19 211 4.28 3.72–4.85
5 4 20 205 4.16 3.60–4.72
majority of the respondents were female
(51%), fell in the 18–45 age group (61%),
had a school-level education (i.e., up to 18
years of age; 54%), and were employed
(51%). The average annual household (gross)
income was in the region of £25,000–£30,000.
A comparison with the 2011 UK census data
shows that the respondents in our study
were similar to the general UK population
with respect to gender, age, and employment
status.
Results
In an attempt to tease out the impact of item
position on the BWS choices, we begin this
section with a rudimentary examination of
the choices made by individuals. Following
this, we report results from our econometric
models and post-estimation analysis.
Examination of Choices
As a first step in assessing the role that item
position had on choices in the BWS exercise,
we test the H0 that, other things being held
constant, there is no association between
the set of observed counts of best and worst
choices in each position and their expected
counts. If there is no ordering effect, each
position should be chosen an equal number
of times as the best and worst option. Given
that there were five items per choice task
(i.e., S= 5) and our dataset consists of 4,928
choice observations, this would equate to
an expected breakdown of 985.6 (i.e., 20%)
best and worst choices per position and 246.4
(i.e., 5%) for each combination of best-
worst choices. Table 2 presents the actual
distribution of choices.
Examining the positional spread of best
choices in table 2, there appears to be
some deviations between the observed and
expected distributions. Notably, all else being
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equal, there is seemingly clear evidence
that institutions located closer to the top
of the BWS choice task have a significantly
higher likelihood of being chosen as best (in
this case, most trustworthy), which accords
with findings in Valenzuela, Raghubir, and
Mitakakis (2013). Indeed, with a χ2 test
statistic of 52.006, against the critical value
of 9.488 (χ20.05,4), we can reject the H0 that,
ceteris paribus, the institutions identified as
being most trustworthy were not subject to a
position bias.
It is interesting to note that as we move
our attention to the distribution of worst
choices (in this case, least trustworthy), we
find the opposite finding—other things being
constant, institutions located closer to the
bottom of the choice task were more likely
to be identified as being least trustworthy.
While the pattern is not as striking, the χ2
test statistic of 15.458 (against the same criti-
cal value of 9.488 (χ20.05,4)), does, nevertheless,
point towards a significant ordering effect.
Taking this analysis further, we also com-
pare the 20 best-worst choice combinations.
In this case, we again find that the χ2 test
statistic of 100.239 exceeds the critical value
of 30.144 (χ20.05,19). This provides further com-
pelling evidence to support the rejection of
the H0 in favor of the H1, where position
plays an influential role on the choices made
by respondents.
Estimation Results
While breaking down the choices and non-
parametric test statistics might provide the
first clue of position bias, they cannot rule
out experimental design artifacts relating
to the location of the trust items. For this
reason, we turn to the results of the models
described in the methodology section. We
present these results in table 3. All models
were coded and estimated in Ox version
6.2 (see Doornik 2009, for further details)
using maximum likelihood estimation.4 For
each model, we separately report the esti-
mated trust coefficients for the institutions
used in the BWS survey and position-specific
4 In the case of the models that retrieve class probabilities,
we are mindful of their vulnerability to local maxima of the
sample-likelihood function. Thus, in an attempt to reduce the
possibility of reaching a local, rather than a global maximum,
we started the estimation iterations from a variety of random
starting points. Specifically, we do this by estimating these models
many times, but each time using a different vector of starting
values, which are chosen randomly.
constants—where, for normalization, the final
item (food magazines) and position s= 5 are
arbitrarily set to the base level (i.e., the nega-
tive sum of their respective coefficients) and,
therefore, are omitted from the table. Class
membership probabilities, where applicable,
along with model fit and diagnostic statistics,
are also provided in the table.
As a point of reference, our analysis starts
with the MNL model with position-specific
constants, as specified in expression (4).5
Looking firstly at the results of this model,
we observe that on average, respondents are
more likely to trust communication on nan-
otechnology and its use in food production
from government institutions and scientists
compared to non-government organizations,
food handlers, friends and family, and the
media. To ease the interpretation, we provide
the ratio-scaled probabilities, as described
in equation (3) in table 4. For instance, this
reveals that, under the MNL model, the
information coming from the Food Standard
Agency is, on average, considered to be more
than seven times more trustworthy compared
to information provided in newspapers (i.e.,
13.94/1.97).
The position-specific constants retrieved
under our first model provide an impor-
tant insight into position effects. Firstly,
we draw attention to the fact that they are
non-zero, and importantly, in most instances
the deviations from zero are statistically
significant—meaning that we reject the H0
that there are no systematic differences due
to item position. Moreover, the position-
specific constants differing between the
best and the worst choices also signifies
that the schematic cues stemming from an
item’s position are not the same for best
and worst choices. Notably, the values of
the position-specific constants for the best
choices (γb) are of a higher magnitude com-
pared to those obtained for the worst choices
(γw)—implying that, other things remain-
ing constant, the position bias is stronger
for the best choices compared to the worst
choices. Interestingly, in accordance with the
pattern of observed best choices in table 2,
there is a reduction in the position-specific
5 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the MNL
model without position-specific constants, nor the MNL with
only position-specific constants. With log-likelihood values of
−12, 495.56 and −14, 728.66, respectively (versus a null log-
likelihood of −14, 762.97), these were both found to be inferior
to our reference model in table 3, which is associated with a
log-likelihood of −12, 455.82.
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Table 3. Estimation Results
MNL LC1 LC2 LC3
LL −12,455.82 −11,818.46 −11,687.46 −11,478.93
K 23 25 47 53
ρ¯2 0.155 0.198 0.205 0.219
AIC 24,957.64 23,686.91 23,468.92 23,063.87
BIC 25,107.20 23,849.48 23,774.55 23,408.51
Trust coefficients
βˆ1 |t–rat.| βˆ1 |t–rat.| βˆ1 |t–rat.| βˆ2 |t–rat.| βˆ1 |t–rat.| βˆ2 |t–rat.|
Government institutions
EFRA 0.89 20.71 1.68 25.34 1.87 24.53 −0.05 0.61 1.95 23.58 0.95 6.91
FSA 1.41 31.52 2.41 34.12 2.64 31.63 0.25 3.17 2.78 32.59 1.33 9.08
DH 0.98 22.53 1.79 26.55 1.96 25.45 0.05 0.68 2.07 25.07 0.85 5.99
Scientists
FoodIndSci 0.68 15.92 1.29 19.65 1.53 19.48 −0.13 1.81 1.82 22.68 −0.47 2.91
UniSci 0.85 19.84 1.42 21.63 1.51 21.09 0.35 4.80 1.52 18.68 1.33 9.77
Non-government organizations
ConsumOrg 0.77 17.93 1.09 17.50 1.01 14.68 0.76 9.90 0.89 10.75 1.97 14.19
EnvGrps −0.11 2.70 −0.38 6.12 −0.63 8.53 0.44 5.89 −0.89 11.65 1.40 9.60
Food handlers
Manufact −0.76 17.90 −1.15 19.12 −1.09 16.36 −0.61 8.06 −0.87 10.50 −2.51 16.04
Farmers −0.14 3.40 −0.39 6.44 −0.46 7.07 0.15 2.01 −0.42 5.43 −0.18 1.12
Supermkt −0.88 20.55 −1.37 23.39 −1.39 21.46 −0.46 6.26 −1.31 18.15 −1.89 13.86
Butchers −0.35 8.33 −0.78 12.79 −0.93 13.98 0.21 2.83 −0.95 12.70 −0.24 1.38
Friends and family
Friends −0.73 17.17 −1.39 22.83 −1.56 23.53 0.16 2.15 −1.66 23.37 −0.53 3.29
Media
News −0.51 12.09 −0.88 14.96 −0.93 14.21 −0.19 2.58 −1.07 15.16 −0.18 1.50
FoodProg −0.52 12.27 −0.84 14.42 −0.91 14.40 −0.25 3.58 −1.02 14.76 −0.32 2.72
NewsPaps −1.18 27.27 −1.79 29.60 −1.87 28.17 −0.56 7.66 −2.02 26.46 −1.13 9.24
Position-specific constants
γˆ1 |t–rat.| γˆ1 |t–rat.| γˆ1 |t–rat.| γˆ2 |t–rat.| γˆ1 |t–rat.| γˆ2 |t–rat.|
Best
γb1 0.19 6.23 0.36 7.01 0.14 3.02 0.31 5.98 1.14 5.51 0.25 3.12
γb2 0.10 3.22 0.21 4.13 0.04 0.87 0.19 3.82 1.07 5.38 0.10 1.28
γb3 −0.10 3.02 −0.14 2.56 −0.08 1.81 −0.11 1.93 0.22 1.03 −0.13 1.91
γb4 −0.07 2.32 −0.13 2.21 −0.05 1.00 −0.10 1.84 −0.92 2.22 −0.03 0.48
Worst
γw1 −0.07 2.12 −0.16 2.95 −0.06 1.55 −0.12 2.13 0.16 0.75 −0.23 3.12
γw2 0.05 1.68 0.17 2.93 −0.01 0.16 0.18 3.14 0.16 0.69 0.14 1.84
γw3 0.11 3.38 0.16 3.02 0.12 2.89 0.08 1.47 −0.31 1.92 0.29 3.80
γw4 −0.05 1.54 −0.15 2.91 0.04 1.06 −0.17 3.42 −0.48 4.11 −0.05 0.78
Unconditional class membership probabilities
πˆ |t–rat.| πˆ |t–rat.| πˆ |t–rat.| πˆ |t–rat.|
πβ1γ1 1.00 fixed 0.19 2.98 0.66 18.97 0.01 1.02
πβ1 0.53 7.58 0.36 4.34
πγ1 0.27 12.09 0.06 3.76
πβ2γ2 0.34 12.84 0.06 1.48
πβ2 0.14 3.14
πγ2 0.16 7.74
πβ1γ2 0.21 2.62
πβ2γ1 0.00 0.00
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Table 4. Ratio-scaled Probabilities
MNL LC1 LC2 LC3
x
∗
Pr(x)
∗
Pr(x|β1) E
( ∗
Pr(x)
) ∗
Pr(x|β1)
∗
Pr(x|β2) E
( ∗
Pr(x)
) ∗
Pr(x|β1)
∗
Pr(x|β2) E
( ∗
Pr(x)
)
Government institutions
DEFRA 10.45∗∗∗ 13.50∗∗∗ 10.10∗∗∗ 14.17∗∗∗ 5.84 11.36∗∗∗ 14.30∗∗∗ 9.60∗∗∗ 11.55∗∗∗
FSA 13.94∗∗∗ 17.30∗∗∗ 12.12∗∗∗ 17.81∗∗∗ 7.35∗∗ 14.28∗∗∗ 18.02∗∗∗ 11.86∗∗∗ 14.14∗∗∗
DH 11.00∗∗∗ 14.08∗∗∗ 10.41∗∗∗ 14.65∗∗∗ 6.31 11.83∗∗∗ 14.97∗∗∗ 9.04∗∗∗ 11.82∗∗∗
Scientists
FoodIndSci 9.12∗∗∗ 11.21∗∗∗ 8.88∗∗∗ 12.24∗∗∗ 5.45∗∗ 9.95∗∗∗ 13.65∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗ 9.91∗∗∗
UniSci 10.20∗∗∗ 11.97∗∗∗ 9.29∗∗∗ 12.16∗∗∗ 7.95∗∗∗ 10.74∗∗∗ 12.00∗∗∗ 11.87∗∗∗ 10.69∗∗∗
Non-government organizations
ConsumOrg 9.66∗∗∗ 10.05∗∗∗ 8.27∗∗∗ 9.35∗∗∗ 10.53∗∗∗ 9.74∗∗∗ 8.52∗∗∗ 15.62∗∗∗ 9.44∗∗∗
EnvGrps 5.03∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗∗ 4.75∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 8.48∗∗∗ 4.65∗∗∗ 2.10∗∗∗ 12.30∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗
Food handlers
Manufact 2.89∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗
Farmers 4.90∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 6.81 4.36∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗
Supermkt 2.60∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗
Butchers 4.12∗∗∗ 2.42∗∗∗ 4.22∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 7.15∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 3.35∗∗∗
Friends and family
Friends 2.97∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 6.90∗ 3.09∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗
Media
News 3.59∗∗∗ 2.20∗∗∗ 4.10∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 5.22∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 4.22∗∗∗ 3.27∗∗∗
FoodProg 3.57∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ 4.15∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 4.94∗∗∗ 3.05∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗
NewsPaps 1.97∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 2.18∗∗∗
Magazines 3.99∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ 4.36∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗ 5.55 3.51∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 3.76 3.49∗∗∗
Note: The Krinsky-Robb (1986) simulation technique (using 100,000 draws) was employed to generate empirical distributions of the parameters, from
which the standard errors were constructed (H0:
∗
Pr(·) = 6.25 (i.e., 100/16); ∗p-value ≤ 0.05, ∗∗p-value ≤ 0.01 and ∗∗∗p-value ≤ 0.001).
constants as one moves from the top to the
bottom item position. The position-specific
constants for the worst choices indicate a
somewhat different pattern. While position
bias does not seem to have played as strong a
role, the estimates do, nonetheless, imply that
compared to the uppermost and lowermost
items, respondents were slightly less inclined
to choose items located in the center when
making their worst choices, which is similar to
the findings in Dayan and Bar-Hillel (2011).
To facilitate the interpretation, we calculate
the probability of each combination of pairs
being chosen using only the position-specific
constants. The retrieved, ceteris paribus, best
and worst position probabilities are reported
in table 5. From these calculations, the posi-
tion effects predicted under the MNL model
are seen more clearly.
Our second model (labeled LC1) is a
latent class logit model. In this model, each
latent class is described by the set of specific
heuristics described in equation (5), rather
than a set of marginal class-specific utilities
that is more common in latent class models.
Firstly, we remark on the large increase in
the model fit. Indeed, at the expense of just
two additional parameters, we witness an
improvement of over 600 log-likelihood
units. The magnitude of this increase does
provide evidence in favor of simultaneously
accounting for the three information pro-
cessing strategies over the assumption of
processing homogeneity. However, we do
acknowledge that this improvement is partly
due to the fact that the panel nature of the
data is being accounted for, making it difficult
to truly corroborate this. With an uncon-
ditional class membership probability of
πβ1 = 0.53, more than half of the respondents
made their best and worst choices indepen-
dently from the item’s position. Crucially,
however, this draws attention to the alarming
fact that, for almost half of the respondents,
the item’s position influenced its likelihood of
being chosen.
In addition, we observe that over one-
quarter (i.e., πγ1 = 0.27) of respondents are
predicted to have made their choices solely
based on item position. Scrutinizing the
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Table 5. Position Probabilities
MNL LC1 LC2 LC3
s Pr(s) Pr(s|γ1) E(Pr(s)) Pr(s|γ1) Pr(s|γ2) E(Pr(s)) Pr(s|γ1) Pr(s|γ2) E(Pr(s))
Best
1 0.24∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.24∗ 0.23∗∗∗
2 0.22∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.22∗∗∗
3 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.19 0.18∗ 0.19∗ 0.14∗ 0.18 0.19∗
4 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19 0.17∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.19 0.18∗∗
5 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19 0.15∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.17∗∗∗
Worst
1 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.12∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.21
2 0.18∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
3 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.19 0.18∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
4 0.21∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19 0.24∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.21 0.21∗∗
5 0.22∗ 0.22 0.21 0.22∗ 0.21 0.22∗ 0.14 0.24∗ 0.21
Note: The Krinsky-Robb (1986) simulation technique (using 100,000 draws) was employed to generate empirical distributions of the parameters, from
which the standard errors were constructed (H0: Pr(·) = 0.2 (i.e., 1/5); ∗p-value ≤ 0.05, ∗∗p-value ≤ 0.01 and ∗∗∗p-value ≤ 0.001).
position-specific constants (along with the
derived probabilities in table 5) reveals a
similar pattern of position bias to that which
emerged from the MNL model. We note,
however, that in the case of LC1, the esti-
mated position-specific constants only relate
to the subset associated with the utility func-
tions given by equations (5b) and (5c). Within
these two classes, as presented in table 5, the
top two positions alone account for over half
of the best choices (0.27 for the first, 0.25 for
the second position). In contrast, the respec-
tive figure for the bottom two positions is
approximately 30% (0.16 for the fourth, 0.14
for the fifth position). Although, again, posi-
tion is found to be less influential in the worst
choices, we find further supporting evidence
of an inclination towards the top and bottom
positions.
Our next model (labeled LC2) assumes
two latent classes, which differ in terms of the
trust coefficients and position-specific con-
stants (i.e., the utility functions represented
by equations (7a) and (7d)). This model
attains a superior fit as compared to the
MNL and LC1 models. Although estimating
separate trust coefficients and position-
specific constants for each class comes at a
very high parametric cost, the ρ¯2, as well as
both information criteria, confirm this finding
even after accounting for the loss of parsi-
mony. We find that the main differences in
the trust coefficients and ratio-scaled prob-
abilities between the first and second latent
classes (which are associated with uncon-
ditional class membership probabilities of
πβ1γ1 = 0.66 and πβ2γ2 = 0.34, respectively) are
the level of trust placed on communication
from government institutions and scientists.6
Other things being equal, whereas the first
class considers information originating from
these institutions to be highly trustwor-
thy (ratio-scaled probabilities in the range
12–18), the second class considers the infor-
mation relatively less reliable (ratio-scaled
probabilities in the range 5–8). The second
class appears to deem communications on
nanotechnology relatively more trustworthy
when it originates from friends and family, as
well as media sources.
Focusing on the position-specific constants
for the best choices, we again discover that
the average effect on utility declines as we
move from the top item position to the bot-
tom item position. Interestingly, this same
position bias is manifested in both latent
classes, though it appears to be more per-
ceptible and statistically significant in the
second class. We also find the position effect
in worst choices. The effect is quite similar in
both classes and broadly consistent with that
uncovered in the previous models.
Our final model (labeled LC3) is a further
latent class logit model combining features of
LC1 and LC2 that simultaneously accounts
6 We acknowledge that the conversion to ratio-scaled proba-
bilities does not factor out the scaling of the parameter estimates
that is related to the scale factor of the unobserved Gumbel
error component. In each of our models (and latent classes) these
scale parameters are normalized (essentially to 1.0), which we
admit thereby prevents any meaningful comparison of parame-
ter estimates and ratio-scaled probabilities between models (and
classes). Notwithstanding this limitation, we feel that the ratio-
scaled probabilities do nevertheless provide a valuable insight
into how position bias and the manner in which it is addressed
has an impact on the model outputs.
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for position effect and trust heterogeneity
by allowing for all eight utility expressions in
equation (7). As expected, LC3 is associated
with the best model fit. This is corroborated
by all of the diagnostic statistics that account
for the increase in estimated parameters. The
trust coefficients and ratio-scaled probabil-
ities correspond reasonably well to those
retrieved under LC2.
Relatively speaking, classes associated with
βˆ1 (with an aggregate unconditional class
membership probability of πβ1 + πβ1γ1 +
πβ1γ2 = 0.58) once more perceive govern-
ment institutions and scientists as more
trustworthy than other institutions. Classes
estimated with βˆ2 (with an aggregate uncon-
ditional class membership probability of
πβ2 + πβ2γ2 + πβ2γ1 = 0.20), however, again
favor information from friends and family,
non-government organizations, and media
sources. Indeed, comparing these groups of
consumers, the first group considers informa-
tion from food industry scientists to be, on
average, 19 times more trustworthy compared
to information provided in newspapers (i.e.,
13.65/0.72), whereas the second groups deem
the information to be less than two times as
trustworthy (i.e., 3.31/1.83).
Of central interest in this paper is the
effect of position on consumers’ choices in
the BWS survey. From the results of our
best-fitting model, we find that approximately
half (i.e., πβ1γ1 + πγ1 + πβ2γ2 + πγ2 + πβ1γ2 +
πβ2γ1 = 0.50) of the respondents used posi-
tion, to some extent, as a schematic cue.
Inspecting position probabilities (table 5)
obtained from the position-specific constants
for the best choices for LC3, we again see
that irrespective of the item itself, respon-
dents are systematically more inclined to
choose an item if it is located at the top of
the BWS task. This tendency reduces as
the item approaches the bottom position.
Startlingly, 40% of the respondents asso-
ciated with the first set of position-specific
constants (i.e., in the column denoted by
Pr(s|γ1)) are predicted to choose the top
item, no matter what it is. This proportion,
however, drops to only 4% for the bottom
position. While we add a cautionary note
that this behavior only applies to a subset of
6% (i.e., πˆγ1 = 0.06 in LC3) of respondents,
it is clearly non-trivial. Interestingly, the two
sets of probabilities established for the worst
positions show contrasting patterns. Respon-
dents estimated as having γˆ1 appear to be
subject to a strong centrality bias (Shaw et al.
2000; Attali and Bar-Hillel 2003), or center-
stage effect (Valenzuela and Raghubir 2009),
whereas a top-bottom effect (Meier and
Robinson 2004; Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011)
is found for those with γˆ2. Taking the effects
of item position on best and worst choices
together, the results stemming from LC3
provide compelling evidence on the extent to
which an institution’s position influences its
likelihood of being identified as the most and
least trustworthy. This is an important finding
and it provides important insight into the
decision-making heuristics adopted in BWS.
In an attempt to uncover any differences
in class membership due to individual
characteristics, in table 6 we compare the
mean conditional estimates of the LC3
class probabilities across different socio-
demographic variables.7 This reveals that,
relatively speaking, male respondents are,
on average, more than twice as likely to
belong in the classes where γˆ1 is derived (i.e.,
π¯∗β1γ1 + π¯∗γ1 + π¯∗β2γ1 totals 0.092 and 0.044
for males and females, respectively). While
the respective aggregate conditional class
membership probabilities associated with
γˆ2 do not vary substantially between male
and female respondents (0.445 and 0.425,
respectively, obtained by π¯∗β2γ2 + π¯∗γ2 + π¯∗β1γ2 ),
we draw attention to the noticeably larger
value of π¯∗γ2 retrieved for male respondents.
Collectively, the conditional class member-
ship probabilities suggest that almost 30%
of male respondents (π¯∗γ1 + π¯∗γ2 = 0.287)
made their best and worst choices without
regard to the items themselves, but rather
used only the item’s position to make their
choices. In contrast, the relative proportion
for female respondents is nearly half of that
(π¯∗γ1 + π¯∗γ2 = 0.163). This gives a clear signal
that male respondents appear more prone
to infer position as a simplifying heuristic.
Similarly, our results provide some evidence
that the likelihood of position biases differed
between age, level of education, employment,
and, to a lesser extent, household income.
Position bias aside, on average, respondents
who are female, aged over 60, or are students
all have a notably higher relative conditional
probability of belonging in classes associated
with βˆ1 (i.e., π¯∗β1 , π¯
∗
β1γ1
and π¯∗β1γ2 ). In contrast,
7 For this, we use Bayes’ theorem to obtain a “posterior”
estimate of the individual-specific class membership probabilities:
π∗cn =πc
Tn∏
t=1
exp(Vcnit )∑J
j=1 exp(Vcnjt )
/∑C
c=1 πc
Tn∏
t=1
exp(Vcnit )∑J
j=1 exp(Vcnjt )
.
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Table 6. Comparison of Conditional Estimates of the LC3 Class Probabilities across
Individual Characteristics
N π¯∗β1γ1 π¯
∗
β1
π¯∗γ1 π¯
∗
β2γ2
π¯∗β2 π¯
∗
γ2
π¯∗β1γ2 π¯
∗
β2γ1
Gender
Male 300 0.004 0.313 0.087 0.069 0.150 0.200 0.176 0.000
Female 316 0.011 0.405 0.032 0.055 0.126 0.131 0.239 0.000
Age
18–45 years 377 0.010 0.372 0.087 0.042 0.094 0.178 0.217 0.000
46–60 years 131 0.003 0.281 0.012 0.103 0.240 0.193 0.168 0.000
Over 60 years 108 0.006 0.418 0.018 0.083 0.165 0.082 0.229 0.000
Educational attainment
School level 335 0.008 0.346 0.069 0.056 0.119 0.191 0.211 0.000
Post-school qualification 281 0.008 0.377 0.047 0.070 0.159 0.133 0.206 0.000
Employment status
Student 66 0.007 0.433 0.062 0.036 0.072 0.137 0.252 0.000
Employed 313 0.009 0.334 0.090 0.060 0.136 0.174 0.198 0.000
Unemployed/unable to work 141 0.009 0.357 0.020 0.065 0.145 0.199 0.203 0.000
Retired 96 0.004 0.402 0.013 0.082 0.176 0.104 0.220 0.000
Annual household income (gross)
Less than £11,500 125 0.011 0.352 0.053 0.045 0.106 0.219 0.215 0.000
£11,500–£24,999 148 0.004 0.372 0.054 0.072 0.137 0.161 0.199 0.000
£25,000–£34,999 165 0.014 0.356 0.071 0.057 0.132 0.153 0.216 0.000
£45,000 and over 89 0.003 0.343 0.074 0.076 0.185 0.131 0.187 0.000
Undisclosed 89 0.004 0.378 0.038 0.064 0.146 0.149 0.221 0.000
Total 616 0.008 0.360 0.059 0.062 0.138 0.165 0.208 0.000
classes relating to βˆ2 (i.e., π¯∗β2 , π¯
∗
β2γ1
, and π¯∗β2γ1 )
appear to be relatively more likely to be com-
prised mostly of respondents who are male,
aged between 46–60 years, retired, and whose
annual household income falls in the highest
category. These differences also suggest some
observable sources of preference heterogene-
ity, as also revealed in Nilsson, Foster, and
Lusk (2006) and Innes and Hobbs (2011).
Scenario Analysis
To further tease out the effects of position
bias, we explore choice probabilities for a
specific choice task. This analysis uses the
estimates reported in table 3 to assess choice
predictions under each of the model (and
latent class) specifications. For this analysis,
in order to clearly demonstrate the reper-
cussions of the position bias, we deliberately
place the items that were consistently found
to be the least and most trustworthy, namely
newspapers and the Food Standards Agency,
at the top and bottom positions, respectively.
For the intermediate positions, we place
environmental groups, farmers/growers, and
food industry scientists sequentially in posi-
tions 2–4 (as portrayed in figure 1). Results
from this post-estimation analysis are given
in table 7. For ease of comparison, we also
report the expected values, which accounts
for the unconditional class membership
probabilities.
As expected, under the MNL model we
observe the largest prediction for best choice
to be the Food Standards Agency (51%), and
newspapers having the smallest probability
of choice (2%). The predictions for the worst
choice are essentially the mirror image of
the best choice (2% for FSA and 58% for
newspapers).
Results arising from LC1 clearly show how
the predictions differ depending on the pro-
cessing strategy adopted by respondents. For
respondents whose choices were in no way
influenced by position, 70% are predicted
to identify the Food Standards Agency as
being the most trustworthy to provide accu-
rate information on nanotechnology. This is
in contrast to the prediction of only 14% who
made their choices exclusively based on item
position. Relatedly, whereas the respective
prediction for newspapers is effectively zero
in the first two latent classes, it jumps to 27%
in the case of the third latent class, which
is comprised of those who made choices
based on item position only. Although there
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Table 7. Scenario Probabilities
Best Worst
NewsPaps EnvGrps Farmers FoodIndSci FSA NewsPaps EnvGrps Farmers FoodIndSci FSA
Model 1
Pr(s) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
Model 2
Pr(s|β1) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.22∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Pr(s|β1, γ1) 0.01∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Pr(s|γ1) 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.21 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22
E(Pr(s)) 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.21 0.54∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
Model 3
Pr(s|β1, γ1) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.23 0.71∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.18 0.13∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Pr(s|β2, γ2) 0.11∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.20 0.13∗∗∗ 0.18 0.38∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
E(Pr(s)) 0.04∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.20 0.53∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
Model 4
Pr(s|β1) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.21 0.13∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Pr(s|β1, γ1) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.13 0.09∗∗ 0.30 0.46∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.18 0.19 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Pr(s|γ1) 0.40∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.14
Pr(s|β2) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.19 0.26∗ 0.03∗∗∗
Pr(s|β2, γ2) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.25 0.03∗∗∗
Pr(s|γ2) 0.24∗ 0.23∗ 0.18 0.19 0.16∗ 0.23∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.21 0.24∗
Pr(s|β1, γ2) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.16 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Pr(s|β2, γ1) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.23 0.38∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
E(Pr(s)) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.20 0.50∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
Note: The Krinsky-Robb (1986) simulation technique (using 100,000 draws) was employed to generate empirical distributions of the parameters, from which the standard errors were constructed (H0: Pr(·) = 0.2 (i.e., 1/5);∗p-value ≤ 0.05, ∗∗p-value ≤ 0.01 and ∗∗∗p-value ≤ 0.001).
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is, again, a reversal of the predictions as we
move to the worst choice, position bias plays
a somewhat lesser role.
The separate predictions based on LC2
are a consequence of differing levels of trust
placed on the items and position-specific
constants. For this model, we draw particular
attention to the marked difference between
predictions for the best and worst choices
across the two classes, which is a consequence
of different preferences as well as position
effects.
Interpreting the predictions of LC1 and
LC2 demonstrates the difficulty of decipher-
ing whether these differences are an artifact
of heterogeneous levels of trust or position
bias. To some extent, LC3 overcomes this
issue of confounding since both of these
influences are isolated. For instance, com-
paring the two groups of respondents who
made choices independently of position, we
see that for one group the Food Standards
Agency is deemed most trustworthy (i.e.,
Pr(s|β1) = 0.69), while for the other group it
is environmental groups (i.e., Pr(s|β2) = 0.44).
For both of these groups, the probability of
choosing newspapers as being most trustwor-
thy is effectively zero. However, as already
established, for the respondents who com-
pletely disregarded the items and chose
purely based on position, the probability of
choosing newspapers as being most trust-
worthy is either approximately 40% or 24%,
depending on which position-specific con-
stants they are associated with (i.e., Pr(s|γ1)
or Pr(s|γ2), respectively). Similarly, the item
predicted as least trustworthy differs across
the eight latent classes. Classes which retrieve
only position-specific constants (i.e., Pr(s|γ1)
and Pr(s|γ2), respectively), and thus accom-
modate position bias, predict a substantially
larger share of respondents who select the
Food Standards Agency as being the least
trustworthy. Related to this, in both of these
classes the respective predictions for newspa-
pers are much reduced. We note here that the
centrality bias identified in classes 1, 3, and
8 (i.e., Pr(s|β1, γ1), Pr(s|γ1) and Pr(s|β2, γ1),
respectively) has also led to relatively higher
predictions of worst choices for farmers and
food industry scientists.
Discussion and Conclusion
We present results from a best-worst scaling
(BWS) study investigating consumers’ trust
in different sources of information regarding
the use of nanotechnology in food produc-
tion. As part of the analysis, we explore the
behavioral proposition that respondents used
position as a schematic cue when making
choices in best-worst tasks. To empirically
explore this issue, we use position-specific
constants and a series of latent class logit
models, where the classes differ according
to: (1) the extent to which location confers
a systematic advantage or disadvantage of
being chosen, and/or (2) trust in institutions.
Hitherto, position effects have been over-
looked in the analysis of BWS data. From
this study, we report several important
methodological insights. Firstly, a simple exa-
mination of observed choices and the use
of a straightforward non-parametric test
can help signal the extent of position effects
in a given BWS dataset. However, using
latent class logit models can further shed
light on the issue. In our case study, we find
that the choices made by around half of our
sample were subject to a position effect.
Furthermore, comparing the results from
four different models, we consistently find
evidence that the probability of an institution
being chosen depends not only on the institu-
tion itself, but also on its position in the BWS
choice task. In accordance with findings in
the marketing and psychology literature, in
all models we find that the institution posi-
tioned at the top of the choice task stands a
significantly higher chance of having been
identified as the most trustworthy. While we
do find a position bias associated with the
worst choice, it is not as strong compared to
the best choice. We also find that the position
effects differ between at least two subgroups
of consumers. We further show that the socio-
demographic characteristics of respondents
differ across these subgroups. The most strik-
ing finding is that the choices made by male
respondents were especially sensitive to a
position bias.
From a modeling perspective, the con-
sequences of overlooking position bias are
clear. Substantial gains in model fit can
be achieved and much richer insight into
choice behavior and decision rules can be
obtained. Failing to account for position bias
can result in erroneous coefficients and ratio-
scaled probabilities, and limit their validity
when used for generating policy recommen-
dations. Researchers engaged in the BWS
method should be wary of this phenomenon.
This should be especially considered at the
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experimental design stage, where it is possi-
ble to factor in that some respondents have
an increased tendency to select the item
positioned at the top when making their best
choices, and, perhaps, the bottom item when
they make their worst choices. Armed with
this information, future studies should, at the
very least, ensure that every effort is made
to guarantee that the position of all items
are rotated—so that each item appears an
equal number of times in each vertical (or
horizontal) dimension. The extent to which
this randomization can help mitigate posi-
tion bias would be a useful area for further
research. However, it should be realized that
this alone is unlikely to circumvent this issue,
since, as we show—even where the item posi-
tions were fully balanced and randomized
as part of the experimental design—a large
proportion will make choices independently
from the items themselves (irrespective of
the order in which they are presented).
The number of items to include per
best-worst task is another important con-
sideration. While five items per BWS choice
task has been found to be acceptable, we
should be cognizant of the fact that this may
have been a factor that led to respondents
considering only a portion of the information
available. With fewer items per task, there
may be the potential to reduce these position
effects.
Methodological aspects aside, we find, on
average, that consumers tend to perceive
information about nanotechnology and its
use in food production to be most accurate
and balanced when it originates from gov-
ernment institutions and scientists compared
to non-government organizations, food han-
dlers, friends and family, and the media. Our
results reveal that consumers can be clearly
segmented into at least two separate sub-
groups based on their trust perceptions. The
first subgroup consists mainly of respondents
who are female, aged over 60 years, and who
are currently students and are more inclined
to consider government institutions and sci-
entists as trustworthy. The second subgroup
predominately comprises respondents who
are male, aged between 46–60 years, retired,
and whose annual household income falls
in the highest category. This group appears
to consider non-government organizations,
friends and family, and the media as being
relatively more trustworthy. This insight pro-
vides valuable information for those who are
engaged in communicating food safety. This is
especially important as communication with
consumers about emerging food safety con-
cerns may help explain consumers’ attitude
towards accepting this new technology, which
may then affect its adoption in the industry.
Our results help ensure that communica-
tion can be achieved and contribute to more
effective and successful awareness campaigns.
Some potential limitations of this study
must be acknowledged. Firstly, while we
wanted to bring position bias to the fore, we
appreciate that there are a number of other
decision-making heuristics and processing
strategies that we did not address in this
paper. This would be particularly important
if one aims to explore meaningful differ-
ences among heuristics. Secondly, while our
latent class segmentation of trust percep-
tions and position effects gives us a good
understanding of the heterogeneity across
respondents, we recognize that it would have
been possible to further uncover within-
class continuous variation and/or to increase
the number of classes. We also note that
socio-demographic variables could, of course,
be included as covariates to help establish
respondents’ profiles. However, both of these
would entail considerably more computa-
tional effort. Thirdly, for this analysis we
do not implement nor compare our results
against the models typically used in choice
set generation analysis, such as the inde-
pendent availability logit model (see Swait
and Ben-Akiva 1987, and Swait 2001, for a
description), which might be better-suited for
retrieving which positions were taken into
account by respondents. While initial effort
was given in this area, with J = 20 best-worst
pairs in our case, the choice set generation
was too complex and computationally bur-
densome. We leave this challenge for further
research, and suggest that it would be more
feasible in case studies with fewer items per
choice task. Fourthly, while we recognize the
value of identifying the reasons explaining
the adoption of these position effects, in this
paper we focus only on the identification of
such heuristics and how to accommodate
them. Further, we focus only on position
effects relating to the vertical dimension.
An obvious extension to this paper would
be to test whether or not similar results
would be attained from BWS data based on
horizontally arranged choice tasks.
Notwithstanding these potential limita-
tions, our findings provide compelling evi-
dence for further research in this area. We
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show the repercussions of failing to recognize
position effects in the analysis of our BWS
survey, which casts doubt on the appropri-
ateness of previous BWS studies that have
not addressed position bias. While the results
of previous BWS studies should be viewed
in this light, we must recognize that posi-
tion effects may be unique to this dataset.
We therefore encourage researchers who
have already collected best-worst data to
investigate whether their data shows such
heuristics so that they can establish the
prevalence of this phenomenon and gain
a clearer understanding of its impact for
policy recommendations. We provide a prac-
tical empirical solution for this prevalence,
and our approach is applicable to datasets
without supplementary questions, meaning
that it can be employed in existing studies.
Although we explore the issue of position
bias in BWS, our approach can easily be
adapted to explore other behavioral heuris-
tics that may also be at play in BWS, as well
as in other stated and revealed preference
studies.
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